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História como autoconhecimento: para uma compreensão da 
dimensão existencial e ética do passado histórico
This essay explores the existential and ethical dimension 
of the historical past from two different perspectives. 
In the first part, the essay approaches the issue by 
examining the personal dimension of the historical past 
from the perspective of the individual subject. This 
examination elaborates the individual’s perspective by 
literary illustrations from W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz. In 
the second part, the essay approaches the issue from 
a conceptual perspective in order to articulate the ways 
in which the idea of a historical past connects with 
the concept of history as self-knowledge. The essay 
engages with R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history 
to show that there are significant ethical and existential 
aspects of the concept of historical past. In conclusion, 
the essay argues that, from both the perspective of 
the individual and conceptually, there is an important 
personal dimension residing within and not only beyond 
the historical past.
History; Historical understanding; Historiography
Este ensaio explora a dimensão existencial e ética 
do passado histórico a partir de duas perspectivas 
diferentes. Na primeira parte, o ensaio aborda a 
questão, examinando a dimensão pessoal do passado 
histórico a partir da perspectiva do sujeito, elaborando 
a essa perspectiva por meio de ilustrações literárias de 
Austerlitz, de W. G. Sebald. Na segunda parte, o ensaio 
aborda a questão sob uma perspectiva conceitual, a 
fim de articular as maneiras pelas quais a ideia de um 
passado histórico se conecta ao conceito de história 
como autoconhecimento. O ensaio se articula com 
a filosofia da história de R. G. Collingwood, a fim de 
mostrar que existem aspectos éticos e existenciais que 
são significativos para o conceito de passado histórico. 
Por fim, o ensaio argumenta que, tanto da perspectiva 
individual quanto conceitual, existe uma importante 
dimensão pessoal que reside dentro e não apenas além 
do passado histórico.
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HISTÓRIA DA
HISTORIOGRAFIA
Introduction
The historical past is the past understood by the methods 
of historical research. What makes the historical past personal? 
There are at least two distinct ways of understanding this 
question. On the one hand, one may read the question as 
being about the relation between the historical past and 
individual human beings living at particular times and places. 
In this sense, the question will be about investigating, from the 
outside so to speak, the ways in which it can be an existential 
and ethical concern for individuals to understand the past by 
the methods of historical research. On the other hand, one may 
read the question as being about the general relation between 
the sense-making processes internal to the historical method 
and the very possibility of human self-understanding. If one 
reads the question in the latter sense, then one is interested 
in conceptual relations and not merely the contingent, 
empirical overlaps between the personal and the historical. The 
investigation in this case will be about the ways in which the 
concept of historical understanding necessarily connects with 
the (logical) possibility of self-understanding for historically-
situated subjects. 
In the following essay, I will explore the existential and 
ethical dimension of the historical past. I will argue that the root 
of the personal dimension of the historical is the unavoidable 
entanglement between our historical and practical relations to 
the past. In this respect, my essay opposes several influential 
accounts that tend to construe history as an inherently 
disengaged, alienated and objectivist discourse. It is this idea 
of history that serves as a central motivating factor for the 
recent turn towards ‘historical experience’, ‘presence’ and 
‘practical past’ among key contemporary historical theorists 
(ANKERSMIT 2005; RUNIA 2014; WHITE 2014). In fact, these 
concepts were launched as instruments for exploring personal 
relations to the past that history, by its very nature, allegedly 
lacks. In opposition, this essay argues that the personal resides 
within and not only beyond historical relations to the past. 
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The first part of the essay engages this issue from the individual 
subject’s perspective, whereas the second part engages the 
issue on a conceptual level by examining interconnections 
between the concept of historical past and the idea of history 
as self-knowledge. 
I explore the perspective of the individual by revisiting 
themes from W. G. Sebald’s book Austerlitz. This is the same 
book that both White and Runia use for illustrating their own 
theoretical claims; namely, that the past becomes personal 
only in the form of ‘practical past’ or ‘presence’ (WHITE 2014, 
p. 8; RUNIA 2014, p. 62). I will offer an alternative reading in 
order to show that Austerlitz elaborates not only the workings 
of  ‘practical past’ or ‘presence’, but illustrates vividly the 
view expressed in this essay; that there is an unavoidable 
entanglement between our historical and practical relations 
to the past. I argue that Austerlitz makes palpable personal 
dimensions within the historical past from the perspective 
of the individual, and this feature of history takes shape 
through the historically displaced protagonist of Sebald’s book. 
In the second part of the essay, I will address questions about 
whether there is also a personal dimension of history that can 
be unfolded by examining conceptual connections between 
historical past and the pursuit of human self-knowledge. 
The essay explores this dimension of the personal through a 
philosophical elucidation of the ways in which the very concept 
of historical understanding necessarily connects with ethical and 
existential dimensions of the self-understanding of historically-
situated subjects. For this purpose, I will clarify Collingwood’s 
idea of history as self-knowledge in order to show that there is 
a personal dimension within the basic processes of rendering 
actions and events intelligible in history. In conclusion, I will 
argue that both of these explorations support the main claim 
of the essay: the personal resides within and not only beyond 
the historical past.
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Personal historical past from the perspective of the 
individual 
In his book Austerlitz, Sebald writes:
[I]f I am walking through the city and look into one of those 
quiet courtyards where nothing has changed for decades, I 
feel, almost physically, the current of time slowing down in the 
gravitational field of oblivion. It seems to me then as if all the 
moments of our life occupy the same space, as if future events 
already existed and were only waiting for us to find our way to 
them at last, just as when we have accepted an invitation we 
duly arrive in a certain house at a given time. And might it not 
be […] that we also have appointments to keep in the past, in 
what has gone before and is for the most part extinguished, 
and must go there in search for places and people who have 
some connection with us on the far side of time, so to speak? 
(SEBALD 2011, p. 257-258).
This voice belongs to the evasive and anxious main 
character of the book. He grew up in a small town in Wales with 
foster parents and later at a boarding school due to his foster 
mother’s depression. During his upbringing, he felt a constant 
concern that something obvious was kept hidden from him. 
In his teenage years, the headmaster of his school summons 
him and tells him that his name is not, despite what he himself 
believes, Dafydd Elias, but Jacques Austerlitz. When he has 
been told his real name, the young Jacques asks: “Excuse me, 
sir, but what does it mean?” To which the headmaster gives a 
laconic reply: “I think you will find it is a small place in Moravia, 
site of a famous battle, you know.” (SEBALD 2011, p. 68-69).
Jacques Austerlitz carries on with his real name, but forgetful 
of the history of his own life. He excels in school, receives 
a scholarship for university studies and will later become a 
lecturer and researcher in the history of art. Successively, his 
studies develop towards manic investigations of the architectural 
history of monumental public buildings such as prisons, mental 
hospitals and train stations. Jacques Austerlitz is conducting a 
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far-ranging trip to research the family resemblances between 
monumental buildings when he meets the narrator of the 
book. This research, which was meant to become his doctoral 
dissertation, had already swollen beyond reason and consisted 
now of endless preliminary notes from the study of details. 
He did not remember any longer, why he had chosen such a 
comprehensive subject matter, but he said it was probably due 
to insufficient supervision from the start.
When he is about 50 years of age, in the context of an 
investigation of the waiting room in London’s Liverpool Street 
Station, Austerlitz’s past begins to reveal itself through a sudden 
memory flash. Standing in the waiting room, he is paralyzed 
by a vision in which he sees himself and the foster parents 
that have come to meet him. Jacques Austerlitz realizes that 
he must have traveled through this very station almost half a 
century ago. Somewhat later, he listens to a radio program in 
which two women are discussing how they came to England in 
1939 by a so called Kindertransport, out of harm’s way from 
the war on the continent. At that moment, Austerlitz said he 
knew beyond doubt that those memories were part of his own 
life as well. 
Austerlitz investigates, by testimony, archive research and 
visits to important sites, how his own life is entangled with 
the tragic history of 20th century Europe. Austerlitz finds out 
that his father, Maximilian, fled from his hometown, Prague, 
to Paris shortly before the arrival of the Nazis. He learns that 
Maximilian was in hiding for a long time, but later arrested 
and then disappeared in the prison camps of the war. Jacques 
mother, Agáta, chose to remain in Prague – unrealistically 
confident in her own prospects – and persevered until a raid 
in 1942 when she was sent to the ghetto in Theresienstadt. 
Austerlitz never finds definitive information about the final fate 
of his parents, but he is told that in 1944 Agáta is sent east 
from Theresienstadt. 
One can pinpoint the overlap between history and practice 
in the simple yet profound question that Sebald poses for the 
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young Jacques: what does Austerlitz mean? By this question, 
Sebald is brilliantly bringing together two different relations 
to the past that are constantly in friction throughout his book. 
There is, on the one hand, the relation to the past expressed 
by the headmaster of the school: Austerlitz, the Battle of the 
Three Emperors on December 2, 1805. A decisive victory for 
Napoleon that would lead to the dissolution of the Holy Roman 
Empire. An official, dead past, the events of which any school 
pupil will be able indifferently to recite like a fairy tale about 
witches and trolls. In other words, a historical past that is of 
no concern to Jacques in his individuality. If history never has 
the potential to go beyond the headmaster’s stories of ‘great 
men’, then it is certainly doubtful that such ‘history’ would ever 
become a personal concern for Jacques Austerlitz. 
What does Austerlitz mean? It is possible to recast this as 
a question that is both personal and historical simultaneously. 
When answering to such a question, the headmaster might 
instead have told Jacques about a relation to the past that he 
is unable to escape, a history that gets, so to speak, under 
his skin. He may start by telling him that Austerlitz is a Jewish 
name, that Jacques is a refugee from the Nazis. That at the time 
the place, Austerlitz, situated close to Brno in what was then 
Czechoslovakia, had a flourishing Jewish community, and that 
maybe his family had gotten their name from that community. 
That the Nazis built a ghetto nearby in Theresienstadt, at the 
north of Prague, that the Jews of Austerlitz were sent there and 
later to Auschwitz; that it is unlikely that his parents are still 
alive. In brief, the headmaster could have described a past with 
decisive relevance for how Jacques would think about himself 
and his own place in the world. 
How should one understand the relation between, on the one 
hand, the past that is an inevitable part of our self-understanding, 
and, on the other hand, the picture of our past produced 
according to the methods of professional historical research? 
In the words of the British philosopher Michael Oakeshott, the 
issues at hand can be conceptualized as a distinction between 
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the practical and the historical past. Oakeshott illustrates the 
essence of his distinction by an example from his childhood. 
During walks in difficult country with his father, the young 
Oakeshott would get tired, become inclined to lag and perhaps 
rest in the grass. On such occasions, his father would encourage 
him to go further by half-seriously appealing to past record: 
this, Oakeshott’s father would say, “is not what Trojans would 
do” (OAKESHOTT 1983, p. 38). In this colloquial setting, the 
Trojans were for the young Oakeshott “not a long-perished 
people, the intricacies of whose lives, performances and 
fortunes only a critical enquiry could resuscitate from record; 
they were living and to us familiar emblems of intrepidity” 
(OAKESHOTT 1983, p. 38). In Oakeshott’s vocabulary, the 
Trojans belonged to the practical past. They were part of 
that “accumulation of symbolic persons, actions, utterances, 
situations and artifacts’ which is an indispensable ingredient of 
an articulate civilized life” (OAKESHOTT 1983, p. 44).
Oakeshott’s concept of the practical past is very useful 
for highlighting that our concerns with the past are often not 
historical. On the contrary, our everyday approach is to see the 
past in relation to practical concerns in the present. The past 
thus regarded is, by definition, a past that is not thought of 
as worth knowing for its own sake but only “in relation to our-
selves and our current activities” (OAKESHOTT 1991, p. 162). 
We use this kind of past “to make valid practical beliefs about 
the present and the future” (OAKESHOTT 1933, p. 105). By 
contrast, the historical past is a past that is thought to ex-
ist independently of our own concerns. The past of history is 
studied for its own sake and deserves investigation in its own 
right. To understand something historically is to be “exclusive-
ly concerned with the past” (OAKESHOTT 1983, p. 27). The 
consequence of Oakeshott’s distinction is a dichotomy between 
a practical past that is always with us, even during walks in 
heavy terrain, and an alienated historical past that is only to be 
found in history books.
How does the story of Austerlitz relate to the distinction 
between historical and practical past? As I already stated, both 
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White and Runia claim that Austerlitz illustrates the ways in 
which the past matters for an individual beyond history. White 
claims that the story of Austerlitz can be read as “as an alle-
gory of the impossibility of – or to cite Nietzsche – the disad-
vantage (Nachteil) of history “für das leben” (WHITE 2014, p. 
6). White comes to this conclusion by interpreting the story of 
Austerlitz as an illustration showing that “knowledge of ‘histo-
ry’ raises more problems than it solves” and that, for Auster-
litz, it turns out that history is “less than helpful when it is a 
matter of seeking meaning for an individual life or existence” 
(WHITE 2014, p. 6). In support of this reading, White cites the 
fact that Jacques Austerlitz’s historical inquiries seems to re-
veal the ways in which those who “made history” after the war 
were, through monumentalizing, just as keen to hide signifi-
cant truths about the past as the Nazi regime was. Thus, White 
concludes that the lesson to be drawn from the Austerlitz story 
is that there is no such thing as “history” against which “anti-
history” or “mythifications” could be measured and assessed 
(WHITE 2014, p. 6). 
Runia, on the other hand, claims that Sebald was “ob-
sessed with what I have called presence” and interprets Se-
bald’s entire authorship as a project for translating time into 
space (RUNIA 2014, p. 61, 67). The story of the book is ac-
cordingly cast as being about getting in contact with the past 
that made Jacques Austerlitz into the person that he is, and the 
channel for such contact is the unrepresented presence stored 
in the material remains of the past. Centrally, for Runia, the 
story of Austerlitz shows the ways in which the past, despite 
the intentions of the subject, gets in touch with Jacques Aus-
terlitz through the artifacts, buildings, photographs and mon-
uments of the past that somehow remembers him. According 
to Runia, Sebald presents a story about how Jacques Austerlitz 
is moved by the presence of the past through material things 
that “telescope” unrepresented meaning from the past into 
Austerlitz’s present, and this is a “subterranean” process of the 
unconscious beyond the meaning-making process of history 
(RUNIA 2014, p. 101-105).
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Both White and Runia deliver interpretations that reveal 
important aspects of the existential depth in Sebald’s work. Of 
course, given the fact that Austerlitz is a multifaceted work of 
art, it would be absurd simply to claim that their readings are 
somehow wrong or incorrect. Still, their readings are one-sided 
to the extent that they completely neglect important tensions 
between historical and practical relations to the past in Austerlitz. 
The most significant blind spot is that neither White nor Runia 
give any existential or ethical role, except in negative terms, to 
Jacques Austerlitz’s efforts, as an art historian, to explore the 
troubled architectural history of 20th century Europe. I argue 
that it is this important story line in the book that offers the 
possibility of uncovering alternative and existential aspects 
of Austerlitz, which White and Runia have neglected. The 
predicament of Jacques Austerlitz, the art historian, provides 
an illustration of the entanglement of historical and practical 
past from the perspective of the individual subject. 
In the life of Jacques Austerlitz, there can be no clean 
separation between ‘the past in relation to ourselves’ and 
‘the past for its own sake’. For this distinction neglects 
the fact that exploring the past for its own sake may have 
consequences for how we think about the past in relation to 
ourselves. The basic problem of the distinction becomes very 
clear from the perspective of the individual subject: Jacques 
Austerlitz, the art historian, is after all not another person but 
Jacques Austerlitz himself. This entangled predicament of the 
subject is clearly manifest in Sebald’s descriptions of Jacques 
Austerlitz’s research in the history of architecture. As Jacques 
Austerlitz reflects on the subject matter of his investigations, 
he pertinently observes that:
As far as I was concerned the world ended in the late nineteenth 
century. I dared go no further than that, although in fact the 
whole history of the architecture and civilization of the bourgeois 
age, the subject of my research, pointed in the direction of the 
catastrophic events already casting their shadows before them 
at the time. […] And if some dangerous piece of information 
came my way despite all my precautions, as it inevitably did, I 
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was clearly capable of closing my eyes and ears to it, of simply 
forgetting it like any other unpleasantness. (SEBALD 2011, p. 
141).
The inability of Austerlitz to investigate the historical 
past links directly and unavoidably with his inability to come 
to terms with a personal and practical past. In order not to 
expose his repression, and by that exploding his self-image, 
Austerlitz must self-censure his own historical research. This 
censorship concerns no matters of detail: an entire century in 
the history of Europe must be plunged into darkness. In this 
respect, there is truth to one of White’s central claims – that 
history raises more problems than it solves. Nevertheless, the 
fact that history has the possibility of creating problems at the 
personal level for Jacques Austerlitz is a perfect example of 
the point I am arguing for: that historical investigations are 
entangled with practical relations to the past. If there were 
no such entanglement, then history could never become as 
much as a personal problem to begin with. Although White is 
certainly right, that history, by itself, cannot solve personal 
problems.
Sebald wrote in my first quote:
might it not be […] that we also have appointments to keep 
in the past, in what has gone before and is for the most part 
extinguished, and must go there in search for places and people 
who have some connection with us on the far side of time, so to 
speak? (SEBALD 2011, p. 258).
The idea of an ethical imperative, Jacques Austerlitz’s ‘must’, 
expressed in this excerpt by Sebald, shows us how the issue 
about the interconnection between the historical past and the 
practical past should be posed. We are not here dealing with 
the relationship between two logically independent phenomena 
– as when we are investigating whether the rain this morning 
was the cause of the wet asphalt. On the contrary, conceptions 
and repressions about our past are already part of our own 
92
History as Self-Knowledge
Hist. Historiogr. v. 12, n. 31, set.-dez., ano 2019, p. 82-112 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v12i31.1501
practical self-understanding, and this is shown by the fact 
that Jacques Austerlitz’s image of himself could not survive 
a truthful, historical investigation of 20th century European 
history. Our self-understanding, and the practical past internal 
to it, is always already a product of our present historical 
situation, and this means that investigations of our historical 
situation ‘for its own sake’ can have dire consequences for the 
practical images of the past that shape our self-understanding. 
The reason is, of course, the overlap in subject matter: we may 
explore historically exactly that which connects directly with 
what we repress in our practical image of the past.
Undoubtedly, Austerlitz demonstrates a sense in which 
knowledge produced by the methods of historical research, 
may have a deep personal relevance for the individual subject. 
However, one obvious objection to this way of elucidating the 
personal dimension of history would be: how representative is 
the case of Jacques Austerlitz? Clearly, everyone’s life is not 
as tightly connected with traumatic events of 20th century as 
Jacques Austerlitz’s. Someone else may be able to explore 
the history of the 20th century without any dire consequences 
for the practical past of their self-understanding at all. Still, 
the best way of thinking about this contingency is probably 
to view it as scale without either of the extremes – there 
is neither complete lack nor necessary connections with a 
personal dimension from the perspective of the individual. For 
the extremes one would have to, on the one hand, imagine 
cases of history as pure escapism, or, on the other, history 
that dealt only with matters that directly connect with the 
personal life of the individual subject. I leave it up to the 
reader to consider whether it is possible to imagine such cases 
coherently. What requires further exploration is, instead, 
the ways in which there is a necessary connection between 
existential and ethical concerns for the subject’s self-
understanding and the sense-making processes internal to the 
very idea of a historical past. 
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Conceptual connections between historical past 
and the personal
What is the starting point of every attempt to make sense of 
the past in historical research? Answering this question properly 
is crucial for understanding conceptual connections between 
historical past and the pursuit of human self-knowledge. 
The reason is, as I will argue, that the existential and ethical 
relevance of engaging in historical research resides in the 
potential for such research to change the self-understanding 
of the historian. So, what is the starting point of historical 
research? The answer is, I believe, uncontroversial and clearly 
articulated already by G. W. F. Hegel in his Introduction to 
Philosophy of History:
As the first condition to be observed, we could […] declare that 
we must apprehend the historical faithfully. But with such general 
terms as “apprehend” and “faithfully” there lies an ambiguity. 
Even the ordinary, average historian, who believes and says that 
he is merely receptive to the data, is not passive in his thinking; 
he brings his own categories along with him, and sees his data 
through them. In every treatise that is to be scientific, Reason 
must not slumber, and reflection must be actively applied. 
(HEGEL 1998, p. 14).
Hegel’s fundamental point is that history starts from 
contemporary categories of intelligibility. In addition, historical 
research is, by necessity, reflective and the reasons are, one 
the one hand, that history aspires to be a science, and, on the 
other hand, that events and actions in the past may strike the 
contemporary person as utterly unintelligible. Hence, history is 
the active employment of our own categories to render intelligible 
what may seem, on the face of it, as incomprehensible actions 
and events in the past. However, the fact that the historian 
brings his own categories along with him, does not imply that 
the historian merely forces that which is foreign to fit with his 
present categories. Rather, the application of Reason, so to 
speak, must be conducted in ways that both render the foreign 
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intelligible and preserves its otherness. Naturally, this goal will 
place certain demands on revising the current categories of 
the historian in order to make room for otherness. In other 
words, to render what is foreign intelligible involves a two-way 
relation. This relation involves, on the one hand, re-describing 
the objects in order to make them fit with our own categories, 
and, on the other hand, openness towards changes in current 
categories through confrontation with foreign categories of 
intelligibility. In relation to this two-way relation of cultural 
understanding, Peter Winch wrote:
We are not seeking a state in which things will appear to us just 
as they do to members of S [= the alien society], and perhaps 
such a state is unattainable anyway. But we are seeking a way 
of looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that 
it has in some way taken account of and incorporated the other 
way that members of S have of looking at things. Seriously to 
study another way is necessarily to seek to extend our own – 
not simply to bring the other way within the already existing 
boundaries of our own. (WINCH 1972, p. 33) 
Still, this obviously raises the question: how are the 
contemporary categories of the historian to be understood – 
are they not also products of the historical process? In addition, 
are those categories completely transparent to the historian, 
or are the categories themselves only articulated and unfolded 
in and through the activity of sense-making which may show 
their limited application for rendering the foreign intelligible? 
Questions like these led Collingwood to formulate his ideas 
about history as a form of self-knowledge. 
The most basic premise of Collingwood’s idea of history 
as self-knowledge is the contention that the human condition 
necessarily involves the inheritance of historically-constructed 
ideas, practices and institutions from previous generations. 
History is an integral part of human experience itself 
(COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 158). Crucially, the starting point 
for anyone within this human condition is not one in which 
the meaning of inherited ideas, practices and institutions, 
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including their essential relations of power, will be transparent 
to the individual subject. In Collingwoodian terms, we enter 
the human world without knowing the ways in which the past 
is already included in the present. Hence, for Collingwood, 
the historical subject does not first understand herself and 
her own time, and then other subjects and times. Rather, our 
understanding of the present and the past is uncovered in the 
same movement of thought. 
According to Collingwood, history is crucial for the reflective 
self-understanding of the subject. The reason is that historical 
research offers the possibility of understanding other ways of 
thought and life, or in Hegel’s terms the ‘categories’ of others, 
and it is only in the light of such historical contrasts that we 
gain access to a deeper understanding of the characteristics of 
categories and ways of thinking peculiar to our own time and 
place. It is also within the same movement of historical thought 
that we discern to what extent our own ideas and practices derive 
from earlier epochs. The historian, so to speak, disentangles 
the past from the present in which it was already embedded 
(COLLINGWOOD 1926, p. 150). Historical understanding is thus 
effective at both ends: our self-understanding is created in the 
moment that the subject understands the historical object as 
an Other. This means that the starting point for Collingwood is 
non-Cartesian: human beings do not start from a transparent 
self-understanding, but understand themselves only through 
activities directed towards other people. In other words, 
self-understanding is not a thing, but rather a relation that 
presupposes the contrasts created by historical understanding. 
The rest of this essay is dedicated to exploring the existential 
relevance of historical understanding from the perspective of 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history. By exploring Collingwood’s 
idea of history, I hope to provide an alternative, but a necessarily 
somewhat tentative account of the relation between existential 
concerns for reflective self-understanding and the sense-
making process in historical research. The purpose of this 
account is to serve as a thought-provoking alternative to the 
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contemporary theories that leave little or no room for personal 
dimensions within historical ways of understanding the past, 
i.e. the historical past. However, the existential relevance of 
historical understanding is an integral part of Collingwood’s 
general idea of history and his comprehensive vision concerning 
the proper subject matter and practice of historical research. 
Naturally, it will not be possible to defend Collingwood’s entire 
idea of history within the confines of this essay. Within the 
realms of the possible is, instead, to show that questions 
about the existential relevance of historical research connects 
necessarily with perhaps the grandest question of all in this 
field – what is history?
The historical past of thought
Contrary to much classical work in hermeneutics, Collinwood 
is rather optimistic about the possibility of understanding 
otherness in history.1 Collingwood claims that understanding 
otherness is, in principle, always possible. So, why this 
optimism? Collingwood’s ideas about the subject matter of 
history provides the answer. According to Collingwood, the 
historical past is accessible to our understanding because 
the subject matter of the historical past is human “thought”. 
Now, Collingwood’s concept of thought has a much broader 
meaning than our ordinary understanding of that term. The 
best contemporary comparison would probably be the concept 
of historical sense recently developed by Jeffrey Andrew Barash 
in his book Collective Memory and the Historical Past (2016). 
The key point, for Collingwood, is that we can think of the 
human world as different forms of embodiment of thoughts in 
a wide sense. The pertinence of this idea shows itself in a very 
wide range of examples.
For instance, actions embody thoughts, and if we want to 
understand action in the past, then we must think through the 
reasons and epistemic premises for the action from the agent’s 
perspective. Events also embody thoughts, and if we want 
to understand the general character of an event in the past, 
1 - For a detailed assess-
ment of the difference be-
tween Collingwood, Ricoeur 
and Gadamer on this issue, 
see (KOBAYASHI & MA-
RION 2011).
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then we must also reconstruct the contemporary significance 
of the event for the agents themselves. Equally, artifacts also 
embody thoughts, and if we want to understand an artifact – 
say Hadrian’s wall running through England, which Collingwood 
examined for thousands of hours through archaeological field 
work – then we must reconstruct the purpose that this artifact 
served for contemporary agents. In other words, human 
phenomena have a constitutive relationship to “thought”, and 
this is expressed by Collingwood through an allusion to F. W. J. 
Schelling. Collingwood writes:
Nature consists of things distributed in space, whose intelligibility 
consists merely in the way in which they are distributed, or in 
the regular and determinate relations between them. History 
consists of the thoughts and actions of minds, which are not only 
intelligible but intelligent, intelligible to themselves, not merely 
to something other than themselves […] because they contain 
in themselves both sides of the knowledge-relation, they are 
subject as well as object. (COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 112).
Crucially, Collingwood is here making a distinction between 
the constitutive features of two different kinds of objects of 
understanding: (i) phenomena explicable from an outside 
perspective and (ii) phenomena that are already forms of 
intelligence and embody an understanding of themselves as 
part of their very identity. The latter phenomena include not 
only the narrow domains of individual human action but also 
collective social phenomena at large. Unlike planetary motions 
or the atoms of nuclear physics, human practices and institutions 
–such as the family, property, science, art, philosophy etc – 
enter the world with a conception of themselves as part of their 
very constitution.
According to Collingwood, collective human phenomena are 
as closely tied to thoughts as individual action is. For example, 
the practices and institutions of ‘trade’, ‘money’ or ‘family’ are 
what they are in virtue of the concepts and forms of thoughts 
shared by the participants. The practice of ‘trade’ involves 
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understanding the specific relations of buyer and seller, the 
use of money involves thoughts about the relation between 
price and value, and the sense of the notion of a ‘family’ is 
not separable from particular, and historically specific, ideas 
about relations of responsibility between parent and child. The 
shared nature of the relevant concepts contained in human 
institutions and practices are themselves constituted by the 
agreement in responses and reactions in the interaction among 
the agents involved. Thus, human practices and institutions 
contain an internal understanding without which they would 
not be the kind of human phenomena that they are. This 
internal understanding is often not explicit to the participants 
themselves, and historians can go beyond it in reflective 
interpretations of the phenomena in question, but any study that 
completely abandons the participant’s internal understanding 
would simultaneously abandon the phenomena and turn into 
a study of something else.2 In Collingwood’s language, this is 
to say that ‘mind’ is an irreducible element in every part of 
the subject matter of history, from actions to institutions and 
cultural practices.
The elaboration above should clarify the meaning in 
Collingwood’s famous claim, that all history is the history of 
thought. However, that claim will naturally lead to another 
question: what does it mean to understand thought? On 
Collingwood’s account, such understanding is only possible by 
re-thinking past thoughts for oneself: “one can only apprehend 
a thought by thinking it, and apprehend a past thought by 
re-thinking it.” (COLLINGWOOD 1999, p. 223). As the quote 
implies, Collingwood does not assume that there is any peculiar 
problem in understanding past thought in contrast to present 
thought. Collingwood writes: 
If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so rediscover 
the thought of Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same way that 
we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter, or a 
stranger who crosses the street. (COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 219).
2 - The most well-known 
and penetrating discussion 
of these issues is to be fou-
nd in Peter Winch’s work 
which is, in this respect, 
a direct continuation of 
Collingwood’s philosophy 
of history.
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Collingwood puts great emphasis on the idea that we must 
re-think the very same thought of the agent and not merely 
something similar, our re-thought thought cannot simply be a 
good copy. This might sound very contradictory: for is not my 
thought always embedded in my own historical condition, i.e. 
tied to a specific context of other thoughts and emotions, even 
if I may do my utmost to reconstruct the historical world of 
thoughts in which the original thought belongs. Furthermore, 
can it really be the very same thought if I am the one thinking 
it? For unless I literally become someone else, then it seems 
that our thoughts must at least be numerically distinct. I cannot 
become Hammurabi merely through mind power, so to speak. 
Still, these very objections are addressed by Collingwood 
as examples of a misunderstanding of the question at issue. 
To clarify his argument, Collingwood distinguishes between 
the immediacy of thought and thought in mediation. In its 
immediacy, thought is individual and idiosyncratic; it occurs 
“at a certain time, and in a certain context of other acts of 
thought, emotions, sensations, and so forth.” (COLLINGWOOD 
1993, p. 297). Thought in this sense cannot be re-enacted, 
but Collingwood also argues: “an act of thought, in addition 
to actually happening, is capable of sustaining itself and being 
revived or repeated without loss of its identity.” (COLLINGWOOD 
1993, p. 300). This aspect of thought is its propositional 
content, which is what Collingwood calls thought in mediation, 
and viewed under this aspect thought is not confined within 
time. The mediacy of past thought can, therefore, be re-thought 
without loss of identity in the mind of the historian.
Unsurprisingly, this is the most controversial part of 
Collingwood’s concept of understanding thought.3 However, I do 
think there is a rather simple way of explaining the basic point 
Collingwood wants to express. Collingwood’s basic claim is that 
historical research has the possibility to uncover conceptual 
relations in the past without at the same time altering these 
relations merely by understanding them. For instance, using 
Collingwood’s example, which was very typical for his time: 
3 - For discussions and 
refutations of the usual cri-
tique, see (D’ORO 2000; SA-
ARI 1984; VAN DER DUS-
SEN 2016).
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Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon (COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 
213). What did the crossing mean? Well, the basic thought 
embodied in the event is that the Crossing the Rubicon with 
troops constituted an infringement of Republican law in the 
days of Caesar. This thought is accessible to us in virtue of 
our ability to understand what Roman republican law involved. 
There is a conceptual relation between ‘crossing the Rubicon 
with troops’ and ‘violating republican law’ that it is possible for 
us to understand in the same sense as contemporary witnesses 
did. 
If one thinks Collingwood’s example of Caesar is hopelessly 
dated, then consider Russia’s seizing of three Ukrainian vessels 
in the Kerch Strait on November 25th 2018.4 The Ukrainian and 
the UN condemned Russia’s attack as a violation of Ukranian 
waters. It is possible that this event will be interpreted, by 
future historians, as the cause of a third world conflict. But 
that the seizing of the boats on Ukrainian territorial waters 
constitutes a violation of an agreement is not the kind of 
consideration that needs to await the verdict of time and 
retrospective interpretation. For it is entailed by the terms 
of the Russian-Ukrainian treaty that the seizing of the boats 
constitutes an act of aggression. This is a conceptual claim 
that is true come what may and cannot be empirically verified 
or falsified by the future course of events. Collingwood’s claim 
is that re-thinking such conceptual relations is possible from 
whatever time and place we now happen to occupy, and that 
when historians engage in such rethinking they also come to 
understand the conceptual relations – or “thought” – in the 
same sense that contemporary agents did. For Collingwood, 
understanding conceptual relations from the perspective of 
historical agents is to uncover the historical past.
Still, what if the critic now objects: rethinking cannot 
apprehend the conceptual relations of the target actions or 
events as they always were for the agents, for the objects 
of understanding are inevitably transformed by the historian’s 
own categories and ways of thinking. Collingwood would partly 
4 - I owe this example to 
Giuseppina D’Oro.
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agree with this objection and he stresses that rethinking is 
a critical reflection from the historian’s own position in time. 
Collingwood also acknowledges that this critical aspect means 
that “to re-enact [conceptual relations or ‘thought’ in] the 
past in the present is to re-enact it in a context which gives 
it a new quality.” (COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 447). However, 
Collingwood still claims that apprehending conceptual relations 
through re-thinking is not merely the creation of meaning 
through the historian’s own categories, but a process that 
apprehends qualities belonging to the conceptual relations or 
thoughts themselves. Why? Why not simply say that historical 
understanding is an endlessly creative process in which 
whatever meaning we ‘discover’ is merely the product of our 
own concepts and standards of intelligibility. Well, sometimes 
this is indeed the case, for instance in ‘Whig History’, but the 
important question is whether there is even the logical possibility 
of apprehending conceptual relations as they appeared for 
the agents themselves. Collingwood’s argument for this is 
a negative one: he does not offer proof for the existence of 
such a possibility. Instead, Collingwood invites us to imagine 
what denying that possibility would involve for the prospect of 
interpersonal communication in general.
Denying the possibility of having the same thoughts as others 
will get us, according to Collingwood, into severe problems 
about the very possibility of understanding the speech and 
action of other people at a very basic level. Because to deny 
that our thoughts can be the same implies the supposition that 
even the content of thought is always only a function of its 
context. Such a denial would, for example, also mean that we 
cannot really argue or discuss with each other at all. For what 
would I “agree with” or “oppose” if the thought that you are 
expressing in a discussion is always actually different from my 
understanding of what you are saying? After all, your thought 
is a mere product of your own particular context, and your 
context can never be mine as long as I am not you. Alas, we 
are doomed by the contextuality of thought to forever talk past 
each other. This is the reason why Collingwood claimed that 
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the possibility of having identical thoughts could be denied only 
at the cost of solipsism. (COLLINGWOOD 1993, p. 288-289).
According to Collingwood, the identity of thought is a 
logical demand for the very possibility of understanding human 
actions and events. If our re-thought thought is not the same 
but different, then this means that we have not succeed in 
identifying what kind of human phenomenon we are dealing 
with. For think about how we understand movements and 
behavior as expressions of action. One action is, by definition, 
differentiated from another on the basis of the thought it 
embodies, so it is simply nonsense to claim that I understand 
what someone is doing or saying without also understanding 
what thoughts they are expressing. For example: how do we 
differentiate in lecture halls between a person who wants to 
pose a question and the person who is pointing at a broken light 
bulb, if we can never have access to the same thoughts that 
their movements embody? Differently put: without rethinking 
the same thought, we will not able to discriminate between 
actions. Such discrimination and rethinking is, of course, 
something that we constantly do both in our everyday lives 
and in historical research. A testimony to its success is the 
fact that we do not have constant and insoluble problems with 
understanding what other people say and do.
Historical understanding as work on oneself
What does all of this mean for the idea of history as self-
knowledge? Well, it means, for Collingwood, that reflective self-
knowledge from history will only be possible if re-enactment is 
possible. For it is only by rethinking the thought embodied in 
past actions, institutions and traditions, that we will be able 
to investigate whether the ideals of previous epochs are still 
with us. Are the morals or the family ideals of the Victorians’ 
still shaping our present ways of being together with other 
people?5 Nothing but re-enactive understanding will possibly 
tell us the answer. For it is only through re-enactment that we 
will be able to identify the “thought” or historical sense of past 
5 - Those that doubt the 
critical potential of such his-
torical questions should, for 
example, read Jason Tebbe’s 
(2016) short piece on ”Twen-
ty-First Century Victorians”.
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human phenomena, which is the identity of the historical past. 
In addition, every question about whether ways of thinking in 
the past are still part of our self-understanding today, must 
presuppose that we can identify what kind of thoughts we 
are dealing with. Otherwise, we would not even be able to 
discriminate between the kinds of concepts and ways of thinking 
that we consider foreign and those that we consider integral to 
our own time and place.
This idea comes with clear practical consequences. By 
rethinking past thought we will be able to discover the ways 
in which the past lives on, and only by this discovery can our 
lives, as Collingwood solemnly puts it: be “raised to a higher 
potential.” (COLLINGWOOD 2013, p. 106). This is Collingwood’s 
way of saying that the historical past that historical research 
articulates is necessary for living a responsible life. The past 
is included in the present and this entails that our entire form 
of life – all of our distinct ways of acting, thinking, reacting, 
behaving and so forth – are already products of a historical 
process. Human beings do not merely have a history, they are 
their history. However, engaging with historical research is, of 
course, no guarantee that we are discovering the living past 
and not merely perpetuating our own prejudices. 
Jacques Austerlitz studies in the history of architecture 
display the ever-present possibility of self-deception. This 
was evident to Austerlitz himself when he confessed that: “if 
some dangerous piece of information came my way despite 
all my precautions, as it inevitably did, I was clearly capable 
of closing my eyes and ears to it, of simply forgetting it 
like any other unpleasantness.” (SEBALD 2011, p. 141). 
This tells us, in philosophical terms, that the relation between 
historical understanding and self-knowledge is necessary, but 
not sufficient. To engage in an historical investigation does 
not automatically entail that one is challenging one’s own 
self-understanding. On the contrary, as Austerlitz himself 
later observes, his research into the history of architecture 
functioned as kind of surrogate, a compensatory memory, 
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for the knowledge that he was hiding from himself. We may 
deceive ourselves in historical research as much as in any form 
of human activity.
However, one thing is certain: it is only by doing history, in 
the Collingwoodian sense of that term, that there is even the 
possibility of becoming aware of how we are conditioned and 
moved by the past. This necessity stems from the fact that it is 
only through a conscientious historical investigation that one is 
given as much as the opportunity to analyze the ways in which 
our past conditions the self-knowledge we think that we have. 
Collingwood, therefore, rightly stresses that his idea of history 
is a form of self-knowledge. As Collingwood writes: 
If what the historian knows is past thoughts, and if he knows them 
by re-thinking them himself, it follows that the knowledge he 
achieves by historical inquiry is not knowledge of his situation as 
opposed to knowledge of himself, it is knowledge of his situation 
which is at the same time knowledge of himself. In re-thinking 
what somebody else thought, he thinks it himself. In knowing 
that somebody else thought it, he knows that he himself is able 
to think it. And finding out what he is able to do is finding out 
what kind of man he is. (COLLINGWOOD 2013, p. 114-115).
In this quote, Collingwood offers a picture of historical 
understanding as work on oneself about what one can render 
intelligible. From this perspective, it is not difficult to see 
that historical understanding will be indispensable for anyone 
who cares to have an honest and responsible understanding 
of themselves. In contrast, many forms of knowledge do not 
have a necessary relation to our self-understanding – I may 
live responsibly and honestly without, say, knowledge about 
physics, mechanics or biology. This is not the case with inquiries 
relating to self-knowledge, because without self-knowledge 
I will never know if my ideas about, say, the ‘true’ and the 
‘good’ are mere products of my own fears, pettiness or selfish 
interests. Similarly, without historical understanding I will never 
know whether I am living responsibly or merely following habits 
of thought and action inherited from previous generations. 
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Discovering the living past through the re-enactment of past 
thought is, therefore, a precondition for anything worthy of the 
name of self-knowledge. In relation to these issues, Collingwood 
speaks of his idea of history as standing “in the closest possible 
relation to practical life.” (COLLINGWOOD 2013, p. 106).
It should also be clear that Collingwood neither wants, 
nor can, develop a method for solving problems of historical 
understanding. Re-enactment is not a universal method 
for discovering the past as it always was. The reason is, of 
course, that re-enactment within historical understanding, 
similar to interpersonal understanding in general, is a process 
in which the individual subject tries out whether they can 
indeed rethink, and thereby discover, the thoughts that other 
human phenomena embody. In other words, the sense-making 
processes of historical research are inherently personal. Given 
that the individual subject itself features as an integral part of 
the process, there can naturally be no general methodological 
solutions for untangling seemingly incomprehensible human 
phenomena. On the other hand, our failures to understand will 
equally provide material for analysis: for what we after self-
scrutiny still consider incomprehensible will show us as much 
about where we stand as cases in which understanding runs 
smoothly. 
History is, therefore, as Collingwood famously 
claimed, “the only way in which man can know himself.” 
(COLLINGWOOD 2005, p. 180). The reason should now be 
clear: one can only achieve a reflective self-understanding 
through contrasts with the forms of otherness created through 
historical research. As my discussion has shown, Collingwood 
thought that it is, in principle, always possible to discover 
otherness in the realm of meaning. Yet, we may often shun 
away from doing so, which Austerlitz also did for most of his 
life, due to the fact that discovering otherness may tell us things 
about ourselves that we do not want to know. But it is still only 
this realization, about the interconnectedness of reflective self-
understanding and the discovery of otherness in history, that 
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will, according to Collingwood, put us in “a position to obey 
the oracular precept ‘know thyself’, and to reap the benefits 
that only such obedience could confer.” (COLLINGWOOD 2013, 
p. 116).
Still, even if we grant that history is existentially relevant 
as a form of self-knowledge, then this does not mean that 
we have reached a stable resting place for the subject. Quite 
the contrary, the examined life of historical research involves 
the subject in a spiral towards depths without ever touching 
unmovable ground. This was also how the story of Austerlitz 
ends. Sebald writes: 
When we took leave of each other outside the railway station, 
Austerlitz gave me an envelope which he had with him and which 
contained the photograph from the theatrical archives in Prague, 
as a memento, he said, for he told me that he was now about to 
go to Paris to search for traces of his father’s last movements, 
and to transport himself back to the time when he too had lived 
there, in one way feeling liberated from the false pretences of his 
English life, but in another oppressed by the vague sense that he 
did not belong in this city either, or indeed anywhere else in the 
world. (SEBALD 2011, p. 253-254).
The most important pointer of this quote is that the self-
knowledge of history tells the subject not who they always were. 
Instead, the process of research is one in which the subject is 
constantly made and re-made in relation to the questions that 
they pose and the results that they achieve. This gives more 
currency to Hayden White’s well-known dictum that historical 
knowledge is a form of “maker’s knowledge”, as he calls it. 
White writes: 
Historical knowledge, in short, is human self-knowledge and 
especially knowledge of how human beings make themselves 
through knowing themselves and come to know themselves in 
the process of making themselves. (WHITE 2010, p. 266).
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I agree, but this claim cannot stand by itself. For as I 
showed in this essay, history can only be coherently imagined 
as a form of self-knowledge if we also allow for an essentially 
Collingwoodian idea of historical understanding, and this idea 
is centrally premised on the (logical) possibility of rethinking 
conceptual relations in the past as they appeared from the 
agent’s perspective. In other words, historical understanding 
and self-understanding are two sides of a coin, so there is no 
way of having one without the other. Nonetheless, the issue 
of history and self-knowledge points towards underexplored 
similarities between White and Collingwood that would deserve 
further attention. In contrast with the recent turn towards 
‘experience’ and ‘presence’, both Collingwood and White claim 
that history can only be understood within and not beyond 
human realms of meaning. 
Conclusion
In this essay, I have explored the personal dimension of 
the historical past from two different perspectives. Firstly, 
I addressed questions about whether there is a personal 
dimension to the historical past from the perspective of the 
individual. This a question about the personal that highlights 
the existential and ethical relevance of understanding the past 
by the methods of history. I articulated the personal dimension 
of history by revisiting the problematic of the historical past in 
Sebald’s Austerlitz. The purpose of this literary illustration was 
showing that, for Jacques Austerlitz, the distinction between 
practical and the historical past collapsed in his efforts to 
understand the history of 20th century European architecture. 
This entanglement was explained by the potential overlap 
between practice and history from the perspective of the 
individual subject: one may explore historically exactly that 
which connects directly with what one represses in one’s 
practical image of the past. This entanglement is, as I argued, 
an important existential aspect of Austerlitz that both Runia and 
White neglect in their respective interpretations of that book. 
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However, I argued that the entanglement between historical 
and practical past, from the perspective of the individual, is 
not necessary but contingent upon the interests and situations 
of particular, historically placed or displaced subjects. In other 
words, from the perspective of the individual, the historical 
past is only contingently personal.
Secondly, the essay explored conceptual connections 
between the idea of a historical past and the pursuit of human 
self-knowledge. In this part of the essay, I was interested 
in conceptual relations between historical understanding on 
the one hand, and the possibility of self-understanding for 
historically-situated subjects on the other. In contrast with 
the first part of the essay, these sections address not merely 
contingent, empirical overlaps between the personal and the 
historical past, but logical questions about whether there is 
a personal dimension included in the very idea of historical 
understanding. For answering this question about conceptual 
relations, I revisited Collingwood’s idea of history as self-
knowledge through a detailed elaboration of the ways in which 
Collingwood’s idea connects with a comprehensive view 
about the nature of historical research. The presentation of 
Collingwood’s view aimed to offer an account of the ways in 
which even the most basic efforts to render actions and events 
intelligible in historical research involves a personal dimension. 
However, I showed that Collingwood’s view presupposes the 
logical possibility of rethinking conceptual relations in the past 
without at the same time altering them. I offered a brief defense 
of Collingwood by showing the consequences of denying the 
possibility of such rethinking for the possibility of interpersonal 
communication. The aim of the latter part of the essay was not 
to demonstrate that Collingwood’s view is right, but to elucidate 
the conceptual connection between historical understanding 
and reflective self-understanding. 
What is the connection between the two parts of the essay? 
The most significant connection is one about the delineation 
of different kinds of possibilities of personal relevance for 
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the historical past. The first part of the essay shows that the 
potential for the historical past to inform an individual person’s 
self-understanding, and thereby have personal relevance, is 
dependent on the will. This is not a matter of simple choice, 
but a question about resoluteness in the face of uncomfortable 
historical subject matters. Thus, it is a matter for the will in the 
sense that one must struggle against one’s own inclinations 
to avoid historical investigations that are in conflict with one’s 
present self-image – this inclination defeated Jacques Austerlitz. 
In the second part of the essay, the delineation of possibilities 
for personal relevance went beyond issues pertaining to the 
will in order to articulate the sense in which there is, so to 
speak, an existential dimension built into the very idea of 
understanding the past historically, i.e. the historical past. This 
conceptual dimension was articulated by an assessment of how 
historical understanding offers a self-reflective understanding 
of the contemporary categories and standards of intelligibility 
of the historian. 
The central conclusion of my conceptual discussion is one 
about the ways in which the idea of history as self-knowledge, 
and thereby as a certain kind of personal relevance, is dependent 
on the possibility of re-enactment, which Collingwood saw as 
the core of the idea of a historical past. If re-enactment of 
the “thought” or sense of historical actions and events was 
impossible, then there can be no historical contrasts against 
which historically-situated subjects can achieve a critical 
and reflective self-understanding. However, I also showed 
that the very idea of re-enactment relates to Collingwood’s 
comprehensive views about the proper subject matter of 
historical research. In this respect, the essay shows that the 
personal dimension of the historical past is not an isolated 
issue, but connects inevitably with one’s general account of the 
nature of history and the conditions of possibility for historical 
understanding. Thus, the essay tells the reader not what kind 
of conception of history they should choose, but articulates 
the kinds of existential relevance that the different views of 
history can possibly have. If historical understanding consists 
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merely of arbitrary projections of our present categories on 
the blank screen of an unknown past, then history can only be 
existentially relevant as a peculiar psychological phenomenon. 
However, if historical understanding has the possibility of 
discovering otherness in the past, as Collingwood thought, 
then the historical past will be existentially relevant for anyone 
who cares to have an honest and reflective self-understanding. 
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